The  southfield by unknown
International Law Studies – Volume 22 
International Law Decisions and Notes 





















The thoughts and opinions expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily of the U.S. 
government, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the Naval War College.  
24 INTERNATIONAL LA"\V: DECISIONS AND NOTES. 
captured by a British warship after the outbreak of 
war between Great Britain and Germany, and \Vas taken 
into Gibraltar, "rhere she 'vas condemned. 'fhe goods in 
question, of which there were 31 packages, \vere reshipped 
in the British steamship Simla, and were seized on Jan-
uary 27, 1915, by the collector of customs in the port of 
London, after the arrival of the Simla in the 'fhames. 
Parcelpost. HAROLD MuRPHY, for the procurator general. A.rticle 1 
of the Eleventh I-Iague Convention, \vhich provides that 
"The postal correspondence, \vhether of neutrals or of 
belligerents, and whether its character is official or pri-
vate, found at sea in a ship, whether neutral or enemy, is 
inviolable," does not apply to parcels sent by parcel post. 
Herr l(riege, the German delegate at the conference, who 
proposed this particular regulation, explained that" postal 
correspondence" was not intended to include parcels. 
(See vVestlake's International Law, volume 2 (2d ed.), p . 
.. 185) and Oppenheim's International La,v, volume 2 (2d 
ed.), p. 237.) 
SIR SAMUEL EvANS (the president). There is no one 
here to suggest that these goods are inviolable? 
No; there has been no communication at all, and no 
appearance has been entered. 
SrR SAI\;IUEL EvANS (the president). Very well. There 
· IS no appearance, and I order that the goods be con-
den1ned. 
Statement of the 
case. 
THE "SOUTHFIELD." 
[Admiralty in prize.] 
Sir Samuel Evans (the president). July 5, 15, 1915. 
1 Trehern, British and Colonial Prize Cases, 332. 
SUIT FOR CONDEMNATION OF CARGO AS PRIZE. 
On July 16, 1914, the British steamship Southfield left 
Novorossiisk, a Russian Black Sea port, vlith a cargo of 
barley shipped by Wiilker & Co., a firm of German mer-
chants, and consigned "to order, Emden." 
On July 20, one J. R. Heukers, a Dutch merchant, 
carrying on business at Groningen in Holland, bought 
197,000 kilos of the barley and took up the documents 
on July 27; and, by contracts of sale dated July 24 and 
25, one Wilhelm Barghoorn, another Dutch Inerchant, 
bought other portions of the cargo amounting to 200,000 
kilos, the property in \Vhich \Vas transferred to him on 
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July 29 and 31. Both merchants at once resold to cus-
tomers of their own. 
War broke out between Great Britain and Germany on 
August 4, and on August 8, when the Southfield put into 
Plymouth, she was diverted to Portsmouth \Vhere the 
cargo was seized as prize. The vessel was then sent 
round to London \Vhere the cargo was discharged and 
sold, and the proceeds paid into court. 
The two Dutch merchants claimed the release of the 
proceeds of their goods on the ground that they became 
purchasers before the outbreak of the war, and \vith no 
kno,vledge or expectation of the outbreak of war. 
July 15. Sir SAMUEL EvANS (the president). The sit~~ods in tran-
questions arising for decision depend upon the effect of 
the intervention of a state of war upon the rights of cap-
ture of a belligerent in respect of goods sold by an enemy 
to a neutral while the goods and the ship in \Yhich they 
are laden are in transitu. 
The goods consisted of quantities of barley shipped 
before the war at a Russian port upon a British ship and 
consigned to a German port. During the voyage the 
goods were sold by enemy merchants to neutral mer-
chants-namely, to two Dutch merchants-Heukers and 
Barghoorn, carrying on business at Groningen. The 
transactions relating to the sale to I-Ieukers fell within 
the period from July 20 to July 28, 1914, and those 
relating to the sale to Barghoorn within the last week in 
July, 1914. Apart from any question depending upon 
the intervention of war it is not disputed that the prop-
erty in the goods had passed to the neutral purchasers 
before the capture. 
The contention of the Crown \Vas that \Vhen \Var \Vas w~~tbreak or 
declared betv¥een this country and Germany on August 
4, 1914, the goods, \vhich were still in transitu, became 
subject to capture by the Crown, and were confiscable at 
the time of the capture and seizure on August 8, not,vith-
standing the prior sales to the neutrals, on the ground 
that at the time of such sales war \Vas imminent or in 
contemplation of the enerny vendors. 
It is important to examine closely the principle \vhich 
governs the right of capture of goods transferred in 
transitu and to ascertain accurately its limits, as it is 
sometimes apt to be loosely stated. 
In order to deduce the rule, it 'vill be sufficient, I 
think, to refer to t\vo leading cases and to one authorized 
textbook. I take them in order of date. 
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In the Vrow lJfargaretha (1 C. Rob. 336, at p. 337; 1 
Eng. P. C. 149, at p. 151) Lord Sto\vell pronounces upon 
io:.towell's optn- the subject as follo\vs: "In the ordinary course of things 
in time of peace-for it is not denied that such a con-
tract may be made and effectually made (according to 
the usage of merchants)-such a transfer in transitu 
might certainly be made. It has even been contended 
that a mere delivering of the bill of lading is a transfer of 
the property. But it might be more correctly expressed, 
perhaps, if said that it transfers only the right of delivery; 
but that a transfer of the bill of lading, with a contract 
of sale accompanying it, may transfer the property in 
the ordinary course of things so as effectually to bind the 
parties and all others can. not \Veil be doubted. vVhen 
war intervenes another rule is set up by courts of ad-
miralty which interferes 'vith the ordinary practice. In 
a state of war, existing or imminent, it is held that the 
property shall be deemed to continue as it was at the 
time· of shipment till the actual delivery; this arises out 
of the state of war, which gives a belligerent a right to 
stop the goods of his enemy. If such a rule did not 
exist, all goods shipped in an enemy's country would be 
protected by transfers vvhich it would be impossible to 
detect. It is on that principle held, I believe, as a gen-
eral rule, that property can not be converted in transitu, 
and in that sense I recognize it as the rule of this court. 
But this arises, as I have said, out of a state of \Var 
which creates new rights in other parties, and can not be 
applied to transactions originating, like this, in a time of 
peace." 
story's opi n - In the work of 1'1r. Justice Story on the Principles and ion. 
Practice of Prize Courts, tha,t celebrated jurist states the 
rule in the following passage (Pratt's Edition, pp. 64-65): 
"In respect to the proprietary interests in cargoes, though, 
in general, the rules of the common lavv apply, yet there 
are many peculiar principles of prize la\V to be con-
sidered; it is a general rule that, during hostilities, or 
imminent and impending danger of hostilities, the prop-
erty of parties belligerent can not change its national 
character during the voyage, or, as it is commonly 
expressed, in transitu. 'fhis rule equally applies to ships 
and cargoes; and it is so inflexible that it is not relaxed, 
even in owners who become subjects by capitulation after 
the shipment and before the capture. * * * The 
same distinction is. applied to purchases made by neu-
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trals of property in transitu, if purchased during a state 
of war existing or imminent, and impending danger of 
war, the con~ract is held invalid, and the property is 
deemed to continue as it was at the time of shipment until 
the actual delivery. It is otherwise, however, if a con-
tract be made during a state of peace, and without 
contemplation of war; for, under such circumstances, the 
prize courts will recognize the contract and enforce the 
title acquired under it. * * * The reason why 
courts of admiralty have established this rule as to trans-
fers in transitu during a state of war or expected war, 
is asserted to be, that if such a rule did not exist all goods 
shipped in the enemy's country would be protected by 
transfers, which it would be impossible to detect." 
Lastly, in the Baltica (11 Moo. P. C. 141; 2 Eng. P. C. op~\~J.sd o wn ~ s 
628) in the judgment of the lords of the privy council, 
sitting to hear appeals in prize, Lord Kingsdown (then 
Mr. Pemberton Leigh) deals with the rule as applicable to 
ships and goods in the following passages: "The general 
rule is open to no doubt. A neutral, while a war is 
imminent, or after it has commenced, is at liberty 
to purchase either goods or ships (not being ships of 
'var) from either belligerent, and the purchase is valid, 
\Vhether the subject of it be lying in a neutral port or in an 
enemy's port. During a time of peace, without prospect 
of war, any transfer which is sufficient to transfer the 
property between the vendor and vendee is good also 
against a captor if war afterwards unexpectedly breaks 
out. But, in case of war, either actual or imminent, this 
rule is subject to qualification, and it is settled that in 
such case a mere transfer by documents which would be 
sufficient to bind the parties is not sufficient to change 
the property as against captors as long as the ship or 
goods remain in transitu. 
''With respect to these principles, their lordships are 
not a"\vare that it is possible to raise any controversy ; 
they are the familiar rules of the English prize courts, 
established by all the authorities, and are collected and 
stated, principally from the decisions of Lord Stowell, by 
Mr. Justice Story, in his Notes on the Principles and 
Practice of Prize Courts, a work \Vhich has been selected 
by the British Government for the use of its naval officers 
as the best code of instruction in the prize la\\". 'l'he 
59650-24--3 
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passages referred to are to be found in pages 6:3, 64, of 
that "'"ork. 
"In order to determine the question, it is necessary to 
consider upon \\;~hat principle the rule rests, and \Vhy 
it is that a sale "\vhich would be perfectly good if made 
while the property was in a neutral port, or \Vhile it \\"as 
in an enemy's port, is ineffectual if made ·while the ship 
is on her voyage from one port to the other. 1'here 
seem to be but two possible grounds of distinction. 'l'he 
one is, that while the ship is on the seas, the title of the 
vendee can not be cornpleted by actual delivery of the ves-
sel or goods; the other is, that the ship and goods, having 
incurred the risk of capture by putting to sea, shall not be 
permitted to defeat the inchoate right of capture by the 
belligerent po\vers until the voyage is at an end. 
"The former, how·ever, appears to be the true ground 
on which the rule rests. Such transactions during \Var, 
or in contemplation of vtar, are so likely to be merely 
colorable, to be set up for the purpose of misleading or 
defrauding captors, the difficulty of detecting such 
frauds, if n1ere paper transfers are held sufficient, is so 
great that the courts have laid down as a general rule 
that such transfers, \Vithout actual delivery, shall be 
insufficient; that in order to defeat the captors, the pos-
session, as well as the property, must be changed before 
the seizure. It is true that, in one sense, the ship and 
goods may be said to be in transitu till they have reached 
their original port of destination; but their lordships 
have found no case where the transfer was held to be 
inoperative after the actual delivery of the property 
to the owner" (11 Moo. P. C., at pp. 145-146; 2 Eng. 
P. C., at pp. 630-632). 
'l'ransfersin It might be argued that according t.o these authorities transitu. 
transfers in transitu are invalid against belligerent 
captors upon the intervention of war unless there is actual 
delivery before capture; or, in other \VOrds, that if \Var 
has intervened no transfer by documents alone can 
defeat the right of capture. But, in my opinion, that 
proposition is too wide, and is not an accurate delimita-
tion of the true rule. In the passages cited IJord Sto,vell 
speaks of "a state of \Var existing or itn1ninene' .: l\1r. 
Justice Story of "a state of peace, \Yithout conten1plation 
of \Vu.r," and of "a state of war existing or imn1in('nt, 
und impending danger of \Var": and Lord I\:.ingsdo\\''11 of 
"\va.r, either actual or in1n1inont," or "'vn.r nncxpect.edly 
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breaking out" (contrasting it with "a time of peace, 
without prospect of war"), and of "transactions during 
war or in con tern pla tio n of war.'' 
It is important to note the reasons for the rule which are 
elaborated by Lord Kingsdo\vn thus [his lordship repeated 
the passage set out above, beginning "Such transactions 
during war," and continued]: In my vie'v the elen1ent 
that the vendor conten1.plated war, and had the design 
to make the transfer in order to secure himself and to 
attempt to defeat the rights of belligerent captors, is 
necessarily involved in the rule which invalidates such 
transfers. Sales of goods upon ships afloat are now of 
such co1n1non occurrence in commerce that it would be 
too harsh a rule to treat such transfers as invalid unless 
such an element existed. 
29 
I have been considering the rule in its application to Declaration or London. 
the sale or transfer of goods, but it is \Vell to note that 
special and highly artificial rules as to the transfer of 
vessels during or preceding a state of 'var are now laid 
do,vn in the declaration of I.~ondon of 1909-as agreed 
to by the representatives of the powers, and as applied 
by the orders in council in this country. But thesP do 
not apply to goods or merchandise . 
... -\s to the facts in these t\vo cases, it is abundantly 
clear that the neutral purchasers acted with complete 
bona fides throughout; they paid for the goods, and resold 
them to neutral customers of their own before war was 
declared. This 'vould not necessarily conclude the 
Jnatter. 
But I an1. also satisfied that the vendors did not have 
the war between their country and this country (to 
\Vhich the ship carrying the goods belonged) in con tem-
plation 'vhen they sold the goods. The imminence of 
war between Germany and Russia has no materiality in 
considering these cases. In the light of after events, the 
war \vith this country may be spoken of as having been 
imminent, regarded from the point of vie\\-'" of time, in 
the last two weeks of July; but there is no evidence that 
it was regarded as i1n1ninen t in its proper meaning of 
"threatening or about to occur" by German merchants at 
that time; not only so, but I find, after investigation in 
various directions, and on grounds 'vhich I deem satis-
factory, that it 'vas not in fact so regarded by them. 
What the hidden anticipation of the Government of 
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it is not for me to speculate; but I may express my 
humble opinion that our intervention in the 'var upon 
the invasion of Belgium in defense of treaty obligations, 
against the breach of such obligations by the invaders, 
'vas a complete surprise even to their Government. 
Documents and facts 'vhich throw light upon the 
history of the days I have been dealing 'vith between 
July 24 and August 4, 1914, are, I think, admirably 
collected and stated in a -vvork called the liistory of 
T\velve Days, by Mr. J. W. Headlam. 
On the grounds that the German vendors had no 
thought of the imminence of war between Germany and 
this country, and did not have such a war in contempla-
tion at any time while the transactions of sale were taking 
place or before they were completed, I hold that the 
sales to the t'vo Dutch merchants were valid, and that 
the goods were not confiscable. And I decree the release 
to then1 respectively of the net proceeds of the sale of 
their respective goods, 'vhich are now in court. 
THE " GLITRA." 
July 30, 1915. 
1 Entscheidungen des Oberprisengerichts, 34. 
In the prize matter concerning the English steamer 
Glitra, with Leith as her home port, the imperial superior 
prize court in Berlin, at its sitting of July 30, 1916, has 
found as follows: 
The appeals lodged by the plaintiffs under Nos. 9 to 12 of the decision 
are rejected as inadmissible; the appeals of the remaining plaintiffs 
are denied as unfounded. 
The costs of the proceedings in appeal are to be borne by the plaintiffs. 
REASONS. 
Statement of On October 20, 1914, the steamer Glitra, belonging to 
thecase. the firm of Salversent & Co., of Leith, with a general 
cargo on the vvay from Leith to Stavanger, was brought 
to by a submarine, and after the cre'v had left the ship 
she "\Vas sunk, together with her cargo. 
re~~~ti~~s. prize In answer to the summons of the prize court issued in 
accordance 'vith section 26 of the prize court regulations, 
the 13 parties interested in the cargo submitted claims 
for compensation for damages due to the destruction of 
their merchandise. The plaintiffs are members of Nor-
'vegian firms; the plain tiff figuring in claim No. 2 alone . 
